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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEASES-Lease Executed
in Violation of District of Columbia Housing
Regulations Is an illegal ContractBrown v. Southall Realty Co.*
Plaintiff-landlord brought an action for possession based on nonpayment of rent in the Landlord-Tenant Branch of the District of
Columbia Court of General Sessions. Although the parties stipulated
at trial that the rent was 230 dollars in arrears, defendant-tenant
contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to possession because the
lease was an illegal contract under the District of Columbia Housing
Regulations. The trial court rejected this contention and gave judgment for plaintiff. By the time her appeal to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals was heard, the tenant had vacated the premises
and no longer desired to contest the landlord's right to possession.
In response to the landlord's claim that the tenant's abandonment
had rendered the case moot, the tenant argued that her appeal
should still be heard because if the judgment below were left
standing, it would be res judicata on the issue of the validity of the
lease in a subsequent action by the landlord for rent. The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed to hear the appeal and reversed: a lease executed in violation of the District of Columbia
Housing Regulations is void as an illegal contract.1
In reaching its decision the court relied on two sections of the
District of Columbia Housing Regulations: 2 one section proscribes
the renting or offering for rent of housing units the condition of
which is unsafe or unsanitary,8 and the other requires that rented
• 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) [hereinafter principal case].
1. The landlord's motion for rehearing was granted, and on rehearing the court
adhered to its original decision. D.C. Ct. of Appeals, No. 4199, April 17, 1968. As of
this writing the landlord has petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
for leave to appeal to that court. Letter from Florence Wagman Roisman, attorney for
defendant-appellant, May 3, 1968.
2. See Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 934, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1960):
The Housing Regulations were established and authorized by an order of the
Commissioners of the District, dated August 11, 1955. They are arranged in eight
chapters. Chapter l contains uniform definitions. Chapter 2 is the "Housing Code
of the District of Columbia." ••• The following chapters of the Housing Regulations concern the licensing of premises in which a "housing business" is conducted•
• • • Chapter 3 contains general licensing regulations. It specifically incorporates
Chapters l and 2, which are also incorporated into the following chapters prescribing additional licensing requirements for rooming and boarding houses
(Chapter 4); tenements (Chapter 5); apartment houses (Chapter 6); hotels (Chapter
7); and convalescent or nursing homes (Chapter 8).
3. "No persons shall rent or offer to rent any habitation, or the furnishings thereof,
unless such habitation and its furnishings are in a clean, safe and sanitary condition,
in repair, and free from rodents or vermin." WASHINGTON, D.C., HOUSING REGS. § 2304
(1955).
In the context of a tort action brought by a tenant against his landlord for injuries
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premises be maintained in good repair so as to provide "decent"
living conditions.4 The trial record contained evidence that code
violations sufficiently serious to render the rented premises unsafe
and unsanitary existed,!> to the knowledge of the landlord, at the
time the lease was executed and that these violations had not been
remedied by the time of the trial. On the strength of this evidence,
the court concluded that the lease had been entered into in violation
of the two relevant provisions of the Housing Regulations 6 and consequently that it was void.
In support of its holding, the court cited the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Hartman
v. Lubar7 as establishing the general rule that "an illegal contract,
made in violation of the statutory prohibition designed for police
or regulatory purposes, is void and confers no right upon the wrongdoer."8 While the court in the principal case recognized that this
general rule is subject to an exception when a construction of the
legislation involved indicates that legislative intent would not be
furthered by declaring void the product of a prohibited act, 9 it
caused by the collapse of a ceiling, the U.S. Court of Appeals construed this section as
imposing "[a]t the very least •.• an obligation upon the landlord to put the premises
in safe condition prior to their rental." Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgt. Co., 282 F.2d 943,
949 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
4. See WASHINGTON, D.C., HOUSING REcs. § 2501:
Every premises accommodating one or more habitations shall be maintained and
kept in repair so as to provide decent living accommodations for the occupants.
This part of the Code contemplates more than mere basic repairs and maintenance to keep out the elements; its purpose is to include repairs and maintenance
designed to make a premises or neighborhood healthy and safe.
5. The specific violations were an obsU'llcted toilet, a broken second-floor railing,
and an insufficient ceiling height in the basement of the house. The ceiling height,
according to the testimony of an inspector for the Housing Division of the Department
of Licenses and Inspections, precluded the use of the basement for dwelling purposes
under the Housing Regulations. Principal case at 836. The tenant testified, and the
landlord admitted on cross-examination, that during the tenant's inspection of the
house the landlord had shown her how to reconnect a disconnected stove located in
the basement and that one room in the basement had contained bedroom furniture,
The landlord further admitted having told the tenant that tlie basement could be
used for dwelling purposes after the housing inspector had advised her to the contrary. Brief for Appellant at 2.
6. Principal case at 836, citing the provisions quoted at notes 3 and 4 supra.
7. 133 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943). That decision
refused enforcement of a loan contract executed in violation of the District of Columbia Loan Shark Law, D.C. CODE § 26·601 (1957).
8. 133 FJ~d at 45. As authority for this proposition, the Hartman opinion cited
Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922), which voided a deed of Indian land to an
attorney employed by the U.S. Attorney General to handle certain Indian affairs, such
employees being subject to a statute prohibiting them from trading with the Indians
except on behalf of the United States. See also REsTATEMENT OF CoNTRAars §§ 580, 598
(1932); 6 F. WILLISOON, CONTRACTS §§ 1763, 1764, 1787 (rev. ed. 1932); Schoshinski,
Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519, 537-38 (1966),
9. Lloyd v. Johnson, 45 App. D.C. 322, 327 (1916). See also Waskey v. Hammer, 223
U.S. 85, 94 (1912) [cited in Ewart v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 188 (1922)]; REsTATJ;M.!NT
OF CON'I'R,WfJ
ti99, 601; F. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 1764.
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found that the public policy considerations recited in the District
of Columbia Housing Regulations10 could be served only by a
holding that a lease executed in violation of the Regulations was
unenforceable. Significantly, the court bypassed an issue that has
been a perennial obstacle to the development of tenants' remedies at
common law: the traditional proposition that a lease, although containing contractual elements, is primarily a conveyance of an estate. 11
The only reference to this problem is the last sentence of the court's
opinion which asserts that there is no reason to "treat a lease agreement differently from any other contract in this regard." 12
In sidestepping the conveyance doctrine, the court was echoing
a position taken by the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions a few months earlier in the case of Adams v. Lancaster.13 That
case was a suit by a tenant to recover eighty dollars paid to the landlord at the time of entering into an oral lease. Also invoking the rule
of Hartman v. Lubar, the Adams court granted recovery to the tenant
on the ground that the lease was void because of violations of the
Housing Regulations.H The court also went on to deny the landlord's claim for an offset to cover the expenses of preparing the apartment for the tenant's occupancy.
The theory of these two cases, while somewhat limited in its
potential application,111 can be viewed as an encouraging develop•
10. WASHINGTON, D.C., HousING REGs. § 2101 (1955), entitled "Purpose of Regulations," contains a lengthy statement of findings by the District's Commissioners to the
effect that slums and potential slums exist in the District and that such "unfortunate
conditions" are due to a number of "insanitary [sic] or unsafe" housing conditions.
The section concludes with the statement, "The Commissioners, accordingly, promulgate these regulations for the purpose of preserving and promoting the public health,
safety, welfare, and morals."
11. See l AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952) ("The lease is
primarily a conveyance, executed as to the lessor at the time the lease is made, to
which the covenants are merely incidental.'1·
12. Principal case at 837, citing Jess Fisher &: Co. v. Hicks, 86 A.2d 177 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1952), an action for possession based on nonpayment of rent under a lease that
had been executed on the mistaken assumption that the premises were exempt from
the District of Columbia Rent Act by virtue of a 1950 amendment, the lease providing
for a rental amount higher than the ceiling under rent control. The court found that
"[a)ny lease entered into under the mistaken assumption that decontrol had taken
place is, therefore, ineffective." 86 A.2d at 178.
13. Small Claims No. C-12912-67 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Oct. 30, 1967). The opinion is
reprinted in full in 2 LA.w IN AcnoN 14 (1967). The tenants in both Adams and Brown
were represented by attorneys on the staff of the Neighborhood Legal Services Project
of the United Planning Organization, a Washington antipoverty agency.
14. Another ground of illegality in Adams was the fact that the apartment's
Certificate of Occupancy prohibited occupancy by a family as large as the tenant's.
Although both grounds are cited by the court, there is no indication in the opinion
that the result would have been different had the code violations been the only element of illegality in the case. The opinion, for example, contains the statement: "No
persuasive reasons suggest themselves to the court as to why any distinction should
be made between contracts entered into in violation of the Housing Regulations
as opposed to contracts rendered illegal for any other numerous reasons."
15. See text accompanying notes 22-36 infra. See generally Note, Leases and the
Illegal Contract Theory-Judicial Reinforcement of the Housing Code, 56 GEo. L.J. 920
(1968).
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ment to the extent that it reflects a shift away from-the reluctance
of the courts to draw upon contract principles to provide relief to
residential tenants suffering injury attributable to their inherently
unequal bargaining position. The traditional characterization of a
lease as a conveyance rather than a contract16 has led the courts to
conclude that the covenants in leases are independent and thus that
a substantial breach of a material covenant by a landlord does not
excuse a tenant from performance of his covenant to pay rent. 17
While commercial tenants have had some success in winning judicial
application of contract principles to their leases,18 the residential
tenant has for the most part been left to whatever statutory defenses
or causes of action his state's legislature has been persuaded to enact.19
16. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
17. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF l'ROPERTY § 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 3A A. CORBIN, CON·
TRACTS § 686, at 238 (1960); 6 F. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 890, at 585 (3d ed. 1962):
Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 304, 312-13 (1965); Schoshinski, supra note 8, at 534-35; Levi, Focal Levt1rage
Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 275 (1966). Application of the principal of dependency of covenants might be of little assistance to a
tenant unless principles of unconscionability or contracts of adhesion were also employed, for, as Professor Levi points out, a typical form lease has been "characterized
by lawyers as one which grants to the tenant the right to pay rent and precious little
else." Id. at 275. Under the standard lease form used in Chicago, for example, "[t]he
landlord disclaims any intention to alter, repair, or decorate the premises; does not
obligate himself as to common passageways and stairways; and requires the tenant to
waive any tort claims that may arise from the landlord's negligence." Id. at 275 n.2.
One of the arguments advanced by the tenant in the principal case, which the court
did not have to rule on, was that rule 4(c) of the Rules of the Landlord and Tenant
Branch of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, which permits a tenant
to set up an equitable defense by way of setoff in an action for possession based on
nonpayment of rent, had the effect of creating dependency of covenants. Brief for Appellant at 27. The same argument is advanced by Schoshinski, supra note 8, at 536.
Another stumbling block to the development of tenants' remedies at common law has
been the traditional holding that there is no implied warranty in a lease that the
premises leased are habitable. AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra, § 3.45; Lesar,
Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1279, 1285-86 (1960); Schier, Protecting
the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two Approaches, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 670, 675-78
(1966). But see Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), rejecting the
common-law rule and finding a warranty of habitability in a lease of a furnished
house (to a number of Wisconsin students) based on legislative policy contained in a
number of statutes. Schoshinski, supra note 8, at 523-27, argues for a comparable theory
based on expressions of public policy in the District of Columbia Housing Regulations.
18. Schier, supra note 17, at 679. This contrast between the development of the
law of commercial, as opposed to residential leases, while it may be attributable in
part to the greater complexity of the former, is undoubtedly equally a reflection of
the paucity of appellate-level litigation on behalf of residential tenants prior to the
activity of neighborhood legal services projects under the antipoverty program.
19. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 755 (McKinney 1963 and Supp. 1967) (The
court can order rent paid into court if violations of record that are tantamount to a
constructive eviction have been found by a "code enforcement agency" in the tenant's
apartment or building; accrued rent is paid over to landlord after violations are
dismissed); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS art. 7-A (McKinney Supp. 1967) (if conditions
are dangerous to life, health, or safety, an affirmative action can be brought by at
least one third of a building's tenants for which the remedy is the appointment of
an administrator to collect rents and make repairs); N.Y. SocIAL WELFARE I.Aw § 143-b
(McKinney 1966) (the "Spiegel Act," abating rent paid by the Welfare Department if
the conditions in an apartment are dangerous to life, health, or safety); CONN. GEN.
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Assuming that these two cases do reflect a new trend in judicial
thinking about the residential landlord-tenant relationship, it is
necessary to isolate the factors that must exist in a given case in order
to invoke the illegal contract theory. It is clear that the conditions
complained of must constitute a violation of some provision of the
local housing code,20 but at the same time, given the language of
the relevant provisions of the District of Columbia Housing Regulations,21 a relatively trivial code violation that does not create an
unsafe or unsanitary condition would probably not be sufficient to
void the lease. Because of the generally dilapidated condition of most
slum housing, this limitation should rarely create problems for a
rent-withholding slumdweller. Moreover, it has the advantage of
insulating the theory from attack on the ground that it could be misused by a tenant to escape liability for rent because of a technical
code violation of an insubstantial nature. At this point, a caveat must
be offered. On rehearing, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
stated: "In our former decision we did not rule, and we do not
now rule, upon ... any obligation of the tenant to pay for the reasonable value of the use of the property during his occupancy.''22
Thus, it would be possible for a landlord who was properly counseled
to recover part of the rent withheld by the tenants. However, the
issue of "reasonable value" of the use of the property during the
tenant's occupancy is difficult to resolve in the context of a slum
housing market. If a court looked to "market value" of the premises,
it might get a distorted picture of reasonable value because of marketdisrupting influences such as racial discrimination. It would still be
possible for a tenant to argue that, if housing code violations serious
enough to render the premises "unsafe or unsanitary" existed, the
premises had little or no value in housing market where prospective
tenants could exercise an unfettered choice of housing accommodations.23
A more difficult limitation-required at least for the application
STAT. R.Ev. § 79-371 (1960) (rent not recoverable by landlord if he has not obtained
a certificate of compliance with the housing code); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 238, § SA
(Cum. Supp. 1966) (rent not recoverable by landlord if violations of record endangering
health or safety exist; court may order rent paid into court).
20. Principal case at 836.
21. See notes 3 and 4 supra and accompanying text.
22. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., No. 4199 (D.C. Ct. App. April 17, 1968) (order
on rehearing).
23. If the judiciary chose to utilize the market-value concept in this manner, it
would presumably have significant effect upon landlords renting substandard housing.
There is even authority for denying such a landlord any recovery:
One who has given illegal consideration ••• cannot recover reasonable compensation for what he has done. In other words, it is entirely immaterial that the
defendant in fact has been benefited if the bargain is of a seriously illegal nature
or is prohibited by statutes.
6 F. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1787 (rev. ed. 1938). See also Schoshinski, supra note 8,
at 537; llEsTATEMENT OF CON'I"RAC'I'S § 598 (1932).
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of the theory-evolved from the specific facts of Brown-is the requirement of a local housing code provision prohibiting the leasing of
premises unless certain minimal conditions of habitability are met.24'
It should be noted that the court in Brown did not rest its finding of
illegality on the existence of conditions violating the housing code
per se but rather on the conjunction of those violations with the
Housing Regulations' prohibition of the act of renting premises that
are not in decent condition.211 Arguably, the embodiment of minimum standards of habitability in a housing code implies a prohibition against renting premises that do not fulfill those standards, but
such a theory is based on a logical jump that the court in Brown was
not required to make. However, the court may have made that logical jump in its order on rehearing. Significantly, on rehearing the
court omitted any reference to the two provisions of the Housing
Regulations mentioned above; rather, it stated that a lease is void if
executed when housing code violations exist which render the property unsafe or unsanitary.2 6
Another problem raised by Adams and Brown is the question of
whether finding the lease void requires that the landlord know of
the existence of the offending conditions at the time of execution
of the lease. 27 In Brown, the court's summary of the evidence and of
the tenant's position28 both refer in passing to the landlord's knowl24. The existence of a housing code should present no problem, The Housing and
Home Finance Agency estimated in 1963 that since passage of the 1954 Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. §145l(c), which requires cities applying for federal urban renewal funds
to have a code-enforcement plan as part of their "workable program," more than 650
cities had adopted housing codes. HHFA, New Release HHFA-OA-No. 63-325, Dec. 30,
1963. "The Department of Housing and Urban Development, in an unofficial survey,
estimated that there were approximately 1,080 housing codes in existence as of September 30, 1965." Statement of Hon. Clifford Case, Hearings on S. 2331, S. 3549, and
S. 3558 Before the Subcomm. on Business and Commerce of the Senate Comm. on the
District of Columbia, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 38 n.3 (1966). Chicago's housing code
contains a provision comparable to § 2304 of the Washington Code at the beginning
of each chapter, the prohibition being worded in terms of compliance with the
requirements of the chapter. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 78-13, 78-14, 78-15, 78-16
(1963). The N.Y. ST. MODEL HousrNG CODE (Division of Housing and Community
Renewal 1960), on the other hand, has no provision resembling § 2304. (The code is
presented as "a guide to New York municipalities in meeting the housing regulation
requirements under the Federal and State urban renewal programs." Id. at 1.)
25. See note 3, supra, quoting § 2304 of the Housing Regulations. The court also
cited § 2501, set out in note 4, supra, a citation that appears to be essentially a makeweight. Inasmuch as the critical point in time for a finding that the lease is an
illegal contract is the date of execution, premises that were in compliance with the
code at the time of execution but which deteriorated thereafter (thus violation § 2501
but not § 2304) might not qualify for invocation of the theory.
26. Opinion No. 4199 (D.C. Ct. App. April 17, 1968).
27. The separate question of knowledge that the conditions constituted code
violations poses no problem in view of the ancient maxim that ignorance of the law
is no excuse. That maxim was invoked in Adams, for example, in connection with
the court's rejection of the landlord's claim for offset for expenses involved in pre•
paring the apartment for occupancy.
28. Principal case at 836.
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edge of the violations at the time of execution. The original statement of the holding in Brown was silent on the matter; 29 however,
on rehearing the court stated that its holding applied when a landlord leased "knowing" that significant code violations existed.80 On
the other hand, it is possible to argue that such a knowledge requirement is illogical in view of the well-established doctrine that a property owner is criminally liable for housing code violations even absent
either criminal intent or knowledge of the existence of the violations.81 In addition, in a jurisdiction which has a statutory provision
prohibiting renting or offering for rent housing which is unsafe or
unsanitary,82 a decision imposing a knowledge requirement arguably
contravenes the legislative intent in enacting a seemingly clear and
unambiguous provision.
Even if all of the requisite elements of the illegal-contract theory
are present, there is an additional practical limitation on its applicability. Possession under an illegal lease is generally regarded as being
in the nature of a common-law tenancy at sufferance; thus, it is terminable at the pleasure of the landlord.88 In other words, had Mrs.
Brown still been in possession of the premises at the time the court
voided the lease as an illegal contract, her landlord undoubtedly
would have served her with notice that he intended to terminate her
tenancy.84 If she refused to vacate the premises at the expiration
of the statutory notice period,85 her landlord could have brought a
successful action for possession based not on nonpayment of rent
29. See principal case at 837:
The more reasonable view is, therefore, that where such conditions exist on a
leasehold prior to an agreement to lease, the letting of such premises constitutes
a violation of Sections 2304 and 2501 of the Housing Regulations, and that these
Sections do indeed "imply a prohibition" so as "to render the prohibited act
void."
The opinion in Adams gives no clue as to whether the landlord there was aware
of the existence of violations of the Housing Regulations; it is difficult, however, to
draw any firm conclusions from this omission in view of the greater authority of
JJrown and also in view of the extreme brevity of the Adams decision.
30. No. 4199 (D.C. Ct. App. April 17, 1968) (order on rehearing).
31. See Gribetz &: Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
CoLuM. L. REv. 1254, 1279 (1966), and authorities cited therein.
32. WASHINGTON, D.C., HOUSING REGULATIONS § 2304, quoted in note 3 supra.
33. See Schoshinski, supra note 8, at 538.
34. Mrs. Brown's counsel argued that her landlord had been obligated to terminate
the tenancy unless he chose to make the necessary repairs:
[T]he only lawful means by which appellee [landlord] could continue to rent
out the premises involved would be to either make the repairs necessitated by the
duties imposed upon him by the Housing Regulations as a landlord, or to terminate the tenancy by an appropriate thirty-day notice to quit. However, when it is
the duty of the landlord to correct the violations on the premises, it is illegal
for appellee to continue the tenancy, and to fail to exercise either of these options.
Since appellee did neither, the continuation of the tenancy, under a lease, runs
afoul of the rule voiding contracts made in violation of a statutory prohibition
designed for regulatory purposes.
Brief for Appellant at 15.
35. Thirty days written notice is required in the District of Columbia for termina•
tion of a tenancy at sufferance. See Schoshinski, supra note 8, at 541-42.
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but on the expiration of the tenancy at sufferance and her consequent status as a holdover.36
Despite the obvious problems presented by extending the illegalcontract theory to its logical conclusion of a tenancy at sufferance,
there are three situations in which the theory can be usefully applied.
The simplest application is illustrated by the Adams and Brown
cases, where a tenant (1) decides-either before moving in37 or afterwards38-that he no longer desires the particular housing and (2) is
able to find more satisfactory living quarters. Under the illegalcontract theory, such a tenant would be free, in effect, to "break"
his lease and could either escape liability for rent3 9 or, by an affirmative action, recover whatever rent he has already paid.40
The second possible application of the theory, which might be
called the consecutive application, is directed toward a landlord who
evicts a rent-withholding tenant as a tenant at sufferance and rents
the premises again without correcting the code violations. Such a
landlord expects that the subsequent tenant will be ignorant of the
availability of the illegal-contract theory. The landlord's purpose
can be frustrated, and his incentive to evict and relet the premises
removed, if successor tenants can be informed of their right to withhold at least some of the rent under Brown and Adams. A series of
such uncooperative tenants should communicate to the landlord
that he may never collect significant amounts of rent unless and
until he makes the repairs necessary to bring the premises up to
code standards.41
The third possible application, which might be called the collective application, requires both an aggressive organizing forcesuch as a neighborhood legal services project-and an apartment
building in which all or most of the apartments are in sufficiently
bad condition in and of themselves to qualify for the defense or are
36. Although the court's original opinion was somewhat unclear in that it gave
the impression that the tenant might be allowed to remain in possession after the lease
was held unenforceable, the order or rehearing stated that "[i]n our former decision
we did not rule, and we do not now rule, upon any right of the tenant under such a
[void] lease to remain in the property •••." Opinion No. 4199 (D.C. Ct. App. April
17, 1968).
37. E.g., Adams v. Lancaster, Small Claims No. C-12912-67 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Oct.
30, 1967).
38. E.g., principal case.
39. E.g., principal case.
40. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
41. The possibilities for success of such a tactic will be improved by the existence
of a neighborhood legal services project such as the District of Columbia project that
represented the tenants in Adams and the principal case. Such an organization is in a
pasition to know of the theory and to communicate it to successive tenants; the fact
that a series of tenants living in the same apartment are represented in court by the
same organization may also serve to communicate most efficiently to the landlord the
fact that ultimately he is playing a losing game. There may, however, be lay community groups in a given neighborhood that will be in a position to perform the
communications function.
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significantly affected by unsafe or unsanitary conditions in common
areas such as halls and stairways.42 This application of the theory
contemplates organization of the tenants and collective rent-withholding, followed by negotiations with the landlord by the organization or its attorney. In negotiations the tenants could. offer the
landlord two alternatives: (1) suing all the tenants and facing invocation of the Brown defense and consequent loss of a substantial
amount of rent; or (2) promising to make repairs in exchange for
payment by the tenants of the rent then due. If the latter alternative is chosen, payment should be accompanied by a warning that
payment in the following month would be contingent on repairs
having been initiated in good faith by that time. 43 The chances for
success of such a tactic would depend both on the nature of the
building and the financial position of the landlord. The collective
application is best suited for a building in which the amount of
rent legally withheld under Brown is enough to constitute a potent
bargaining weapon and one in which conditions are not so dilapidated that the prospective cost of repairs would lead to the landlord's abandonment. The landlord would ideally be one whose
ownership is a profitable undertaking rather than a marginal enterprise44 and who thus would be unlikely to abandon.
Given the inherent limitations of the illegal-contract theory
and the tactical complexities involved in applying it on more than
a limited scale, the Brown opinion itself can hardly be cheered as a
great step forward in the development of tenants' rights.45 Its ultimate importance will probably lie in its willingness to apply contract principles to a residential lease.46 In this respect, one can hope ·
42. Application of the theory to common areas would be an extension of Adams and
the principal case; however, a forceful argument could be made, for example, that a
third-floor apartment is rendered unsafe by a defective stairway below the third
floor.
4!1. This tactic, in somewhat sketchier form, is suggested by Schoshinski, supra
note 8, at 5!18. A variant on the tactic would involve the tenants taking the position
that payment of rent would be contingent, not on an initial promise to repair, but
on at least substantial completion of the repairs. The adoption of one tactic or the
other will depend on such considerations as the tenants' estimate of the reliability
of the landlord's promise and the possible strategic advantage of a showing of good
faith on their part by a relinquishment of the rentals.
44. For a discussion of the character and typical economic position of the slum•
lord, see Sax &: Hiestand, Slumlordism As a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 892 (1967).
45. The Office of Economic Opportunity, in a press release hailing the decision,
engaged in a bit of legal sophistry by characterizing it as meaning "that when housing
is in violation of the code the landlord cannot go to the courts to compel the tenant
to pay rent or to evict the tenant for nonpayment of rent"-ignoring the landlord's
ability to evict the tenant as a holdover. (See text accompanying note !16 supra.) OEO,
News Release 68-17, Feb. 11, 1968. A Washington columnist found the decision to be
"a slum-fighter's dream" and in effect a legalization of rent strikes. Raspberry, Court
Decision Arms the District's Slum Fighters, Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1968, at BI,
col. 2.
46. See text accompanying notes 11, 15-19 supra.
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that Brown indicates that contract principles will be increasingly applied to permit courts to find that the tcWenants in residential leases
are dependent, 47
47. For an argument for such application and a discussion of the advantages and
remedy that would follow, see Schoshinski, supra note 8, at 5114-87.

